marriage and divorce
From The New Palgrave Dictionary of Economics, Second Edition, 2008
Edited by
Steven
N.
Durlauf
and
Lawrence
E.
Blume
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Abstract
We document the increase in marital turnover and survey economic models of the marriage market. Couples match based on attributes but sorting is constrained by costs of search. Divorce is caused by new information on match quality, and remarriage requires further search. Although most men and women marry, they are single more often than before and more children live in one-parent household. The impact on children depends on child-support transfers. Such transfers may rise with the aggregate divorce (remarriage) rates.
Keywords
altruism; assortative matching; child care; collective models; commitment; comparative advantage; complementarity; division of labour; household production; increasing returns; leisure; marriage and divorce; marriage market; matching model; multiple equilibria; Poisson process; reservation utility; search models; sharing rules; stable sharing rule; time use; transferable utility; unitary models of the household
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How to cite this article
Weiss, Yoram. "marriage and divorce." The New Palgrave Dictionary of Economics. Second Edition. Eds. Steven N. Durlauf and Lawrence E. Blume. Palgrave Macmillan, 2008. The New Palgrave Dictionary of Economics Online. Palgrave Macmillan. 24 May 2013 <http://www.dictionaryofeconomics.com/article?id=pde2008_M000367> doi:10.1057/9780230226203.1043

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