• Table of Contents
    • Abstract
    • Keywords
    • Article
      • Is sharecropping inefficient?
      • Sharecropping as an efficient risk-sharing contract
      • Sharecropping within the principal–agent paradigm
      • Moral hazard in sharecropping
      • Multitasks and contract repetition in sharecropping
    • See Also
    • Bibliography
    • How to cite this article


Pierre Dubois
From The New Palgrave Dictionary of Economics, Second Edition, 2008
Edited by Steven N. Durlauf and Lawrence E. Blume
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Sharecropping is a form of land leasing contract between a tenant and a landlord who share the production. It has a variety of forms and is sometimes linked with credit, lending, or insurance. The apparent inefficiency of sharecropping due to the fact that the tenant receives only a share of the marginal productivity of his labour has attracted economists’ attention since Adam Smith. Within the principal–agent paradigm, sharecropping is now thought of as trading off incentives and risk sharing or as reducing transaction costs for a landlord willing to lend out a piece of land.
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How to cite this article

Dubois, Pierre. "sharecropping." The New Palgrave Dictionary of Economics. Second Edition. Eds. Steven N. Durlauf and Lawrence E. Blume. Palgrave Macmillan, 2008. The New Palgrave Dictionary of Economics Online. Palgrave Macmillan. 17 January 2018 <http://www.dictionaryofeconomics.com/article?id=pde2008_S000111> doi:10.1057/9780230226203.1519

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